America’s Africa Pivot: Securing Critical Minerals and Rare Earths in 2025
Washington steps up a 2025 drive to secure African critical minerals and REEs, directly challenging China’s dominance. Plan centers on a proposed $5bn Critical Minerals Fund, expanded DFC firepower, and the Lobito Corridor linking the Copperbelt to the Atlantic.
In a decisive strategic pivot, the United States has intensified its engagement in Africa in 2025, launching a comprehensive and financially robust campaign to secure critical mineral and rare earth element (REE) supply chains. This assertive push is driven by the escalating global demand for minerals like lithium, cobalt, graphite, and copper—essential for clean energy, technology, and defence sectors—and represents a direct challenge to China’s long-standing dominance in the African mining landscape.
For example, lithium is the backbone of electric vehicle (EV) batteries, high-purity cobalt is crucial for high-performance alloys in jet engines and consumer electronics, and REEs like neodymium and dysprosium are indispensable for the powerful magnets used in wind turbines and EV motors. China currently processes approximately 60% of the world’s lithium, 73% of its cobalt, and over 90% of its rare earth elements, giving it immense leverage over global supply chains.
Under the Trump administration, this new era of engagement is characterized by a coordinated “task force” approach, blending high-level diplomacy, significant financial commitments, and strategic infrastructure projects to position the U.S. as a premier partner for the continent’s mineral-rich nations.
A New Architecture of Engagement
At the heart of the 2025 strategy is a centralized coordination effort helmed by the National Security Council (NSC) to harmonize the actions of a myriad of U.S. actors, from diplomats to military personnel. The administration has appointed David Copley, a former intelligence officer and mining executive from Newmont Corp, to spearhead this procurement strategy, leveraging his background in both the private and public sectors. This leadership is complemented by key figures such as Massad Boulos, Donald Trump’s senior advisor on Africa, who is personally leading sensitive negotiations, including a bilateral agreement with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) over battery minerals.
Boulos, whose son is married to Trump’s daughter Tiffany, has extensive business experience in Nigeria and other parts of West Africa, providing the administration with established personal networks on the continent.
This high-level push is supported by a new legislative and policy framework. The Critical Minerals Security Act of 2025 (S.789), introduced in the 119th Congress, mandates a comprehensive study of global mineral resources to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities in U.S. supply chains. On September 8, 2025, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) released an updated draft list identifying 54 critical minerals, providing a clear roadmap for policy and investment priorities. The urgency was further underscored in a bipartisan Senate hearing on July 30, 2025, which emphasized shifting from aid-based relations to investment-led partnerships to tap into Africa’s estimated 30% share of global critical mineral reserves.
The Financial Arsenal: De-risking and Investment
The cornerstone of the U.S. strategy is its financial muscle, designed to de-risk and catalyze private investment in a sector long dominated by state-backed Chinese enterprises. As of September 2025, a proposed $5 billion Critical Minerals Fund is under negotiation, with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) expected to contribute $2.5 billion, matched by private entities like Orion Resource Partners. This fund aims to support exploration, mining, and processing projects, directly countering Chinese influence in key countries like the DRC (cobalt) and Mozambique.
Furthermore, the Trump administration seeks to dramatically expand the firepower of the DFC, which was created during his first term to finance projects countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Plans are underway to potentially quadruple its investment ceiling from $60 billion to $250 billion, a move that requires Congressional approval. This financial upscaling is already bearing fruit. In 2025, the DFC committed $553 million to the Lobito Atlantic Railway, a flagship infrastructure project. Other notable investments include a $3.4 million technical assistance grant for Pensana’s Longonjo rare earth project in Angola and a $3.2 million grant for a green copper initiative in Zambia.

This financial strategy is notably reliant on private equity and consultants rather than traditional mining operators. The DFC has partnered with private equity group TechMet, acquiring a 15% stake in May to support its projects in Rwanda, Burundi, and South Africa. The administration is also leveraging consultants like GreenMet, founded by a former special forces officer, to act as an intermediary between American funds and African extractive projects. This approach has, however, kept some major U.S. industrial players at a distance. American businessman Robert Friedland is managing the Kamoa-Kakula copper and cobalt mega project in the Democratic Republic of Congo. He was being ignored by the government because he did not want to sever his ties with Chinese investors and buyers. A few days ago, he sold a 4% stake in Ivanhoe Mining, which operates the Kamoa-Kakula site, to Qatar to alleviate this pressure.
Infrastructure and Alliances: Building Resilient Supply Chains
A key pillar of the U.S. plan is the development of strategic infrastructure to create reliable corridors for mineral transport. The Lobito Corridor is the centerpiece of this effort, a 1,700 km railway connecting the resource-rich Copperbelt of Zambia and the DRC to Angola’s Atlantic port of Lobito.
This corridor is seen as a direct competitor to existing routes that run east to ports in Tanzania and South Africa, which are often congested and subject to delays. This project, supported by the DFC, the Export-Import Bank (EXIM), and EU partners, is designed to reduce logistics costs and provide a vital alternative route for minerals destined for Europe and the United States.
Beyond infrastructure, the U.S. is fostering a web of alliances. In early 2025, the State Department signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with Angola, Zambia, Botswana, and the DRC to deepen cooperation on the extraction and processing of cobalt, copper, nickel, and manganese. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has also been instrumental, launching the U.S.-Africa Sustainable Critical Minerals Partnership and convening the Africa Critical Minerals Working Group to align business and policy for sustainable development. These efforts are reinforced by the Department of Defence (DoD), which views the minerals race as a national security issue. The Defence Logistics Agency (DLA) is actively working to build the national stockpile, with plans to acquire half a billion dollars’ worth of cobalt over the next five years.

Western diversification efforts and Défense Applications summary
The trajectory of the global REE supply balance will be determined by the progress of a handful of key projects in Africa that are positioned to become the first significant non-Chinese sources of new production. The status of these projects in 2025 will be a critical indicator of the viability of Western diversification efforts.
| Project Name (Country) | Key Minerals | Operator/Owner | Key Financiers/Offtake Partners | 2025 Status & Key Milestone |
| Ngualla (Tanzania) | Neodymium-Praseodymium (NdPr) | Peak Rare Earths (fully owned by Shenghe Resources) | Shenghe Resources (China) | Acquisition by Shenghe finalized in Sept. 2025. Now fully integrated into China’s supply chain. Focus is on accelerating development plans. |
| Longonjo (Angola) | Neodymium-Praseodymium (NdPr) | Pensana PLC | Angolan Sovereign Wealth Fund (FSDEA), Africa Finance Corp. (AFC), Absa Bank | Main construction commenced in 2025 after securing financing. On track for an 18-month construction timeline, targeting initial production in late 2026. |
| Kangankunde (Malawi) | Monazite (containing NdPr) | Lindian Resources | Iluka Resources (Australia), various institutional investors | Final Investment Decision (FID) taken in Aug. 2025. Fully funded and in construction, targeting initial production in late 2026. A model for the MSP strategy. |
| Steenkampskraal (South Africa) | Monazite | Steenkampskraal Monazite Mine | Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) of South Africa | Phase 1 metallurgical implementation underway with IDC funding. Progressing towards production as a key part of South Africa’s national strategy. |
| Lofdal (Namibia) | Dysprosium, Terbium (Heavy REEs) | Namibia Critical Metals | Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) | Advanced exploration and pilot plant testing stage. A key potential non-Chinese source of critical heavy rare earths. |
Modern defense platforms are critically dependent on REEs for their superior performance, miniaturization, and resilience in harsh environments. The most significant application is in the production of high-strength permanent magnets, primarily Neodymium-Iron-Boron (NdFeB) magnets, which are often enhanced with dysprosium and terbium to improve heat resistance. These magnets are essential components in:
- Precision-Guided Munitions and Missile Systems: Actuators and control systems in weapons like the Tomahawk cruise missile rely on powerful, compact magnets for precise maneuverability.
- Advanced Aerospace Platforms: A single F-35 Lightning II fighter jet contains approximately 418 kg of REE materials, crucial for its weapons targeting systems, radar, lasers, and flight control actuators.
- Naval Vessels: Sophisticated naval platforms have a massive REE footprint. A Virginia-class submarine requires an estimated four tons of rare earths, while an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer uses over two tons for applications in sonar, radar, missile guidance, and electric propulsion systems.
- Surveillance and Communication: REE phosphors, such as europium, terbium, and yttrium, are indispensable for night-vision goggles, high-resolution displays in avionics, and secure communication systems that require enhanced signal integrity and anti-jamming capabilities.
For these reasons establishing a mine-to-magnet supply chain has become a key strategy for the US Department of Defence. The U.S. Department of Defense’s goal of establishing a complete, non-Chinese REE supply chain by 2027 will drive investment not only in African mines but also in processing facilities in allied friend-shoring locations. The partnership between the Kangankunde mine in Malawi and Iluka Resources’ refinery in Australia is being promoted as the ideal template for this strategy. The U.S. will continue to build its domestic processing capacity, such as at the Mountain Pass facility, but recognizes that international partnerships are essential to achieving the necessary scale.

An Evolution of Policy
While the 2025 initiatives mark a significant escalation, they build upon a foundation laid in previous years. U.S. engagement evolved from an early focus on ethical sourcing, exemplified by the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act’s provisions on conflict minerals from the DRC to a more strategic focus on supply chain diversification under the Biden administration. Initiatives like the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) launched in 2022 and the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) laid the groundwork for the multilateral and investment-focused approach now being accelerated.
The MSP, for instance, brought together the U.S. with allies like Australia, Canada, Japan, and several European nations to catalyse public and private investment in responsible mining and processing worldwide.
The road ahead remains challenging. U.S. officials acknowledge that they are working to build a strategic metals supply chain “ex nihilo” to rival Beijing’s decades-long efforts.
Key hurdles include the long lead times for new mine development, which can often exceed a decade, and the technical challenge of building processing and refining facilities outside of China, which requires immense capital and specialized expertise. The success of this financially driven strategy will depend on its ability to translate capital into operational mines and processing facilities that deliver tangible, mutual benefits. For the United States, the goal is clear: to secure its economic and national security by fostering ethical, resilient, and transparent mineral supply chains that support both American industry and African development.

