Israel’s Eastern Mediterranean Strategy: A New Early-Warning Network Around Turkey?

Greece’s talks with Israel are seen not only as a procurement program but also as a reflection of Israel’s regional strategy. After offering early-warning and radar solutions to the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), Israel is now proposing similar sensor and missile architectures to Greece, potentially creating a wider electronic intelligence and early-warning line in the Eastern Mediterranean.

This line could form a radar chain stretching from Israel to the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, Crete, and mainland Greece. Such an architecture would increase visibility over Turkey’s southern airspace, naval and air activity in the Eastern Mediterranean, and critical military movements.

In this context, Israel may be building not only bilateral defense partnerships but also a trilateral integration structure by providing similar radar technologies and air defense platforms to both countries. With Israel’s support, the long-sought joint defense structure between Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus may gain a more operational and concrete form. Such a trilateral architecture could unify information sharing, early-warning capabilities, and joint operational abilities, directly influencing the regional balance of power.

Inside the €3 Billion “Achilles’ Shield” Program

Greece has entered a new phase in its air defense modernization program, which has gained momentum in recent years, by advancing its negotiations with Israel. Under the broad project organized under the name “Achilles’ Shield,” Athens has officially sent Requests for Information (RFI) to Israeli defense companies, asking for detailed information on system specifications, cost ranges, and integration requirements. With a total budget of around 3 billion euros, the project aims to fully replace Cold War–era air defense assets and integrate the country’s airspace into a modern, multi-layered, sensor-supported architecture.

One of the most notable parts of the Achilles’ Shield program is Greece’s plan to replace its long-serving short-range OSA-AKM and TOR-M1 systems with Israel’s Spyder AIO complexes. In this context, Athens is considering acquiring 10 Spyder AIO systems and around 30 associated mobile launchers.

Because all Spyder AIO components are placed on a single mobile platform, the system provides high reaction speed and 360-degree coverage through a multi-sensor structure. This setup is expected to give Greece a more flexible and mobile short-range air defense layer. SPYDER uses Python and Derby missiles to deliver rapid response and mobility against low-altitude threats such as drones, aircraft, and cruise missiles.

In the medium-range band, the seven I-Hawk systems operated by the Hellenic Air Force are approaching the limits of their operational life and no longer meet modern requirements. For this reason, Athens is evaluating the Barak-MX as the new system for the medium-range layer. Barak-MX stands out with its modular structure and missile options offering 150 km and 250 km ranges. If selected, Greece will gain not only greater engagement range but also improved altitude control and more advanced target-kill capabilities.

Barak MX uses three missile types within its modular structure:

• MRAD (~35 km),

• LRAD (~70 km),

• ER (~150 km or more).

In the long-range layer, Greece is focusing on the David’s Sling system. The future of the S-300PMU systems deployed in Crete has long been debated, and Athens is seeking a modern solution capable of countering ballistic threats with up-to-date missile technology. Israel’s David’s Sling has emerged as a leading candidate for this need. Its advanced engagement algorithms and high hit probability against long-range targets would significantly strengthen Greece’s air defense depth.

ELM-2084 MMR Radar and Sensor Infrastructure

Greece has reportedly requested ELTA/IAI’s ELM-2084 MMR (Multi-Mission Radar) systems during negotiations. The ELM-2084 is an AESA multi-mission radar capable of detecting both air-breathing threats (aircraft, missiles, drones) and ballistic targets.

Used in systems such as Iron Dome, this radar tracks hundreds of targets simultaneously and can detect everything from air targets to artillery and rocket fire. Greece’s intention to integrate these radars with both new air defense systems and its current command-and-control structure indicates its commitment to building a network-centric air defense doctrine.

If the negotiations between Athens and Tel Aviv result positively, deliveries are expected to take place gradually between 2025 and 2036. Considering system diversity, infrastructure requirements, training, and integration needs, this long delivery timeline appears reasonable. Radar network construction, nationwide distribution of missile systems, and integration of various platforms into a joint command-and-control structure are complex processes that naturally require an extended schedule.

Strategic Risks and Possible Approaches for Turkey

Greece’s extensive air defense cooperation with Israel could create multidimensional consequences for Turkey. First, the deployment of Israeli radars in both the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus and Greece may form a continuous, coordinated surveillance line along Turkey’s southern flank. This would make it easier to track Turkish Air Force flights over the Aegean, the Mediterranean, and around Cyprus, and could help analyze flight patterns and engagement profiles. Although such a setup may not limit Turkey’s maneuverability, it could reduce operational secrecy.

Another impact would be Greece’s shift to advanced engagement platforms such as Barak-MX and David’s Sling, which would place a more modern air defense layer on Turkey’s western flank. This development could indirectly influence air operations, exercises, and deterrence mechanisms in the Eastern Mediterranean. A potential joint defense architecture between Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus could also create a tighter coordination line around Cyprus.

Among Turkey’s possible responses, accelerating national air defense programs stands out as the most important. Deploying long-range variants of SİPER, increasing the number of Hisar systems, and expanding domestic radar projects nationwide would strengthen Turkey’s deterrence posture. Enhancing electronic warfare capabilities, improving deception and jamming systems, and developing UAV and UCAV platforms with lower observability would also support Turkish air dominance.

Additionally, building a joint sensor network and air defense architecture with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) could enhance Turkey’s surveillance capability around Cyprus to counter the Greece – GCASC – Israel line. Ultimately, the growing strategic cooperation between Greece and Israel represents a multi-layered development that Turkey must manage carefully, both militarily and diplomatically.