Between May and September 2025 Turkey’s state-owned gas company has moved decisively in recent months to reshape the country’s energy security architecture by combining a wave of long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) contracts with an accelerated push to bring new Black Sea reserves into production.
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In May, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced a new 75 billion m³ gas find at the Göktepe-3 well, adding to the 500 billion m³ already identified in the Black Sea’s Sakarya field. Sakarya, connected to the grid since 2023, now produces about 9.5 million m³ per day. Turkey is expanding infrastructure with the Filyos processing plant and the Osman Gazi floating platform—due in 2026 and expected to double output, with domestic production potentially reaching 40 million m³ per day by decade’s end.
At the same time, state-owned company (BOTAŞ) secured new LNG supply to diversify away from Russia and Iran. At Gastech 2025, it booked about 15 billion m³ for 2026–2028 from suppliers such as BP, ENI, Shell, Cheniere, and others. Soon after, it signed a 20-year, 4 billion m³-per-year deal with Mercuria and a nine-year, nearly 6 billion m³ agreement with Woodside Energy. These contracts give Ankara alternatives as legacy pipeline deals with Russia and Iran near expiry.
The largest deal was reached with U.S.-based Mercuria, covering 70 BCM over 20 years starting in 2026. Other long-term contracts include TotalEnergies with 16 BCM over a decade from 2027, Oman LNG with 1.4 BCM annually for 10 years from 2025, and a preliminary arrangement with Woodside Energy linked to U.S. projects from 2030.
Major Long-Term Supply Contracts

Between mid-2025 and the autumn LNG trade season, Turkey added a mix of medium- and short-term supply that gives its state gas company BOTAŞ more flexibility as legacy pipeline contracts with Russia and Iran near expiry. The centrepiece was a package of three-year LNG deals totalling roughly 12 BCM. According to the Energy Ministry, BP agreed to ship about 1.6 BCM a year for three years—4.8 BCM in total—while Shell committed 2.4 BCM over the same period and Eni added 1.5 BCM. Germany’s state-backed trader SEFE signed for 1.8 BCM over three years, and Norway’s Equinor will provide 1.5 BCM on similar terms.
To bridge the near term, BOTAŞ signed shorter contracts that start arriving before the 2026 winter. U.S. exporter Cheniere will deliver 1.2 BCM beginning in the fourth quarter of 2025, while Hartree Partners will supply 0.6 BCM spread over two years and Japan’s JERA committed another 0.6 BCM in a one-year spot-style deal. These incremental volumes are designed to reduce Turkey’s exposure to volatile spot purchases while long-term supply takes effect.

An important operational step accompanied these purchases: Turkey leased an FSRU (floating storage and regasification unit) from Egypt’s state gas company EGAS, expanding the country’s ability to receive and convert LNG cargoes into pipeline gas without locking in extra Egyptian supply. The added regasification headroom helps Ankara integrate new cargoes from multiple sources and manage peak seasonal demand.
By combining roughly 12 BCM of new medium-term LNG with these shorter bridging deals and extra regasification capacity, Turkey strengthens its ability to replace Russian and Iranian pipeline volumes with more diversified imports and to position some gas for re-export once domestic demand is covered.
Medium-term supply adds about 12 BCM from BP, Shell, Equinor, Sefe, and Eni, each committing volumes over three years. Shorter contracts include Cheniere with 1.2 BCM for late 2025, Hartree with 0.6 BCM across two years, and Japan’s JERA with 0.6 BCM. An FSRU lease from Egypt’s EGAS expands regasification capacity rather than imports.
Rising Domestic Production in the Black Sea
Turkey is pairing its new LNG supply with a determined build-up of domestic production from the Sakarya gas field in the western Black Sea, the country’s largest-ever hydrocarbon discovery. The field, first connected to the grid in April 2023, is now averaging about 9.5 million cubic meters per day, equivalent to 3.5 billion cubic meters per year—roughly seven percent of Turkey’s annual demand of around 50 BCM. Officials from the Energy Ministry and state pipeline operator BOTAŞ have said that production is on track to double by 2026, with daily flow expected to reach 20 million cubic meters (about 7.3 BCM annually) and then climb further as additional wells and subsea tie-backs are completed.
The ramp-up hinges on major infrastructure investments. At the heart of the system is the Filyos Natural Gas Processing Plant on the Black Sea coast, where raw offshore gas is treated and fed into the national transmission grid. A new floating production platform, the Osman Gazi, is scheduled to come online in mid-2026. Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar has said this platform will roughly double Sakarya’s current output by linking new well clusters to shore through a 161-kilometer subsea pipeline.

The plan is to scale to 40 million cubic meters per day by 2028, or about 14.6 BCM annually—enough to meet nearly one-third of Turkey’s projected demand if total consumption holds near the 50 BCM mark. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced in May 2025 that reserves in the wider Sakarya block, including the Göktepe-3 discovery, now exceed 575 BCM when added to earlier finds, underscoring Ankara’s long-term goal of turning the Black Sea into a meaningful domestic supply basin.
While Black Sea output alone will not make Turkey self-sufficient, its growth provides Ankara with bargaining power as it renegotiates pipeline deals and integrates new LNG contracts. It also supports the government’s ambition to reduce import dependence, currently above 90 %, and to position the country as a flexible supplier and transit hub for Southeast Europe.
Alongside imports, domestic output is rising. Production at the Sakarya field averages 9.5 million cubic meters per day, or 3.5 bcm annually. Output is set to double by 2026 and reach 14.6 bcm per year by 2028.
Projected Surplus and Demand Balance
Turkey’s supply picture points to a potential mid-to-late-decade cushion, but the only defensible way to frame a “surplus” is as a scenario built from documented inputs: contracted LNG volumes and stated Black Sea ramp-up targets, laid against recent demand. On the demand side, official data show total natural gas inflow to Turkey’s grid was 56.39 BCM in 2024 (a proxy for gross supply to the system), up 9.5% year on year, according to figures published via BOTAŞ and reported by Anadolu Agency. Russia remained the largest supplier, covering about 42% of volumes through the Blue Stream and TurkStream pipelines. Azerbaijan provided 22% via TANAP, while Iranian flows—typically capped at 9.6 BCM annually—slipped to 7.5 BCM. LNG imports accounted for roughly one-third of supply.

If pipeline imports remain steady, Turkey could face a sizable surplus. In 2026, new LNG supply combined with Black Sea output would add an extra 17 BCM, equal to more than one-third of national demand. By 2027, the surplus is projected to climb to 18.3 BCM before stabilizing above 21 BCM annually from 2028 onward, covering over 40% of consumption.

Turkey’s Shifting Energy Role
Turkey’s recent move to increase LNG imports from the United States may reflect more than a short-term effort to secure energy supplies. These purchases could also serve a broader strategic purpose, positioning Ankara to adapt to shifting regional energy dynamics. By diversifying away from long-standing dependence on pipeline gas, especially from Russia, Turkey appears to be strengthening its bargaining power and reducing vulnerability to supply disruptions.
The new agreements also align with the European Union’s stated goal of phasing out Russian gas by 2027. As Europe seeks alternative suppliers, Turkey’s growing LNG capacity and access to U.S. cargoes could allow it to act as a flexible bridge between global producers and European buyers. This diversification not only helps Ankara secure competitive prices but could also enhance its influence in regional energy politics.
In recent years, Turkey has advanced an ambitious plan to transform itself into a regional energy hub. Investments in new pipeline links, expanded trading infrastructure, floating storage and regasification units (FSRUs), and the development of Black Sea gas reserves have all been part of this vision. However, Turkish officials have yet to clarify how the latest U.S. LNG contracts fit into this strategy or whether they will complement Ankara’s hub ambitions by boosting liquidity and market flexibility.

