Turkey Says Russian Oil Imports Are a Commercial Decision, Not a Political One

Turkey’s Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar has defended the country’s continued imports of Russian crude oil, saying the purchases are driven by commercial and technical considerations rather than political alignment, despite U.S. pressure to cut ties with Moscow’s energy sector.

Turkey’s public stance of treating Russian oil imports as a purely “commercial decision” is being tested by mounting pressure from the United States and tangible shifts in its energy acquisition strategy. While Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar maintains that private companies’ choices and refinery specifications dictate the continued, albeit recently reduced, flow of Russian crude, a confluence of diplomatic overtures and strategic energy deals points to a broader geopolitical recalibration by Ankara. This delicate balancing act is not new for Turkey, a nation that has long managed a complex and often contradictory relationship with its powerful Black Sea neighbor, Russia.

Speaking late Thursday in an interview with Turkish broadcaster CNN Türk, Bayraktar stressed that the decision lies with private companies. “This is essentially a decision made by private companies, distributors, and refineries” he said. He added that Turkish refineries were built to process crude from nearby suppliers, making imports from Russia both a commercial choice and a technical necessity.

His remarks come as Washington steps up efforts to persuade allies to scale back Russian energy trade. During a recent meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, U.S. President Donald Trump urged Ankara to halt oil imports from Russia, citing Moscow’s ongoing war in Ukraine. “As long as Russia continues its attacks on Ukraine, I want Turkey to stop buying oil from them,” Trump said.

Turkey remains one of Russia’s largest energy customers, even as it seeks to diversify supplies by negotiating new long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) deals with the United States and other producers. Major Turkish buyers of Russian crude include Tupras, the country’s largest refiner, and the Star Refinery, operated by Azerbaijan’s state-owned Socar.

At the same time, Ankara may soon have an alternative. Iraq has resumed oil exports to Turkey’s Ceyhan terminal in the north after a two-year hiatus, under a U.S.-backed deal. The development could provide Turkey with a new supply route and ease its heavy reliance on Russian crude.

A Deeply Rooted Energy Partnership

The energy relationship between Turkey and Russia is a cornerstone of their bilateral ties, forged over decades and solidified in concrete and steel. Russia has historically been Turkey’s largest single supplier of natural gas, a dependency cemented by major infrastructure projects like the Blue Stream and TurkStream pipelines, which traverse the Black Sea. This energy symbiosis has weathered numerous geopolitical storms, including stark disagreements over conflicts in Syria and Libya, demonstrating a mutual willingness to compartmentalize economic cooperation from political disputes. For Turkey, a rapidly growing and energy-hungry economy, cheap and reliable Russian energy has been a vital economic input. For Russia, Turkey is a critical market and a transit hub for its energy exports to Southern Europe

The Shadow of Sanctions and the F-35 Dispute

The current pressure from Washington is part of a broader, sustained effort by the U.S. and its allies to cripple Russia’s war machine by targeting its most lucrative export: energy. Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and intensifying dramatically after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. has implemented a complex web of sanctions aimed at Russia’s energy sector. Turkey, not being an EU member and trying to carve out a role as a mediator in the conflict, has not formally adopted these Western sanctions, creating a point of friction with its NATO allies.

This friction is amplified by pre-existing tensions, most notably Ankara’s exclusion from the F-35 fighter jet program. Turkey was removed from the multinational project in 2019 after it defied strong U.S. objections and purchased the Russian S-400 air defense system. Washington argued that the S-400 posed a fundamental security risk to the F-35’s advanced stealth technology. The move was a significant blow to Turkey’s military modernization plans. Now, Washington is reportedly dangling the prospect of reentry into the program as a powerful incentive for Ankara to align more closely with Western policy on Russia, specifically by cutting off Russian oil imports.

New Alternatives and Shifting Strategies

In a clear move towards diversification, Turkey has inked significant long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) agreements with American and other international suppliers. A landmark 20-year deal with the energy trading company Mercuria for U.S. LNG, starting in 2026, and another substantial agreement with Australia’s Woodside Energy underscore a strategic pivot. These deals are part of a longer-term strategy by Ankara to reduce its vulnerability to any single supplier and leverage its unique geography to become a global energy trading hub.

Adding another layer to this evolving energy landscape, the long-dormant Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline has resumed operations after a two-and-a-half-year standstill. The pipeline had been shut down due to a complex dispute between the Iraqi federal government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over independent oil exports by the latter. The reopening, facilitated by a U.S.-backed agreement, restores a significant non-Russian crude source directly to Turkey’s Ceyhan port, presenting a viable and immediate alternative that could significantly alter regional energy flows.

The Wider European Context

Turkey is not alone in its struggle with Russian energy dependence. Hungary, for instance, remains a staunch outlier within the European Union, consistently opposing a complete cutoff of Russian oil and gas. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government, which has long pursued an “Eastern Opening” policy of fostering close ties with Moscow, argues that a sudden embargo would be ruinous for its landlocked economy. This position highlights the deep divisions within Europe on how to balance economic realities with a unified geopolitical stance against Russia.

In conclusion, while Turkey publicly frames its energy relationship with Russia in commercial terms, its recent actions are undeniably strategic. Set against a backdrop of deep historical energy ties, significant geopolitical disputes with its Western allies, and a clear, long-term strategy of diversification, the reduction in Russian oil imports and the embrace of new supply routes signal a nation actively and pragmatically reshaping its energy future. The coming months will be critical in revealing the true trajectory of Turkey’s policy, a path that will be closely watched in both Washington and Moscow.