Ukraine Pushes for Tomahawks Despite Major Logistical and Political Barriers

Ukraine’s Zelensky asked Trump for Tomahawk missiles

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky asked U.S. President Donald Trump for Tomahawk missiles to pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin into making peace, Axios reported Friday, citing a Ukrainian official and another source familiar with the leaders’ meeting. The request was made on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly after Trump’s critical remarks about Russia, and Zelensky later confirmed in a separate interview that he had requested long-range weapons.

Ukraine asks the United States for BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Kyiv aims to use these advanced missiles to strike strategic targets deep inside Russia. Ukraine intends to conduct more effective and complex attacks against protected targets in Russian territory. This request reveals the limits of Ukraine’s current strike capabilities and its strategic vision for the future of the war.

“First of all, they have to know where their bomb shelters are. They need it. If they will not stop the war, they will need it in any case.” – Volodymyr Zelensky

Ukraine states that it wants to go beyond the front line and strike strategic targets inside Russia. Apart from the Spider Web operation, Ukraine targeted the Engels-2 strategic bomber base in the Saratov region, refineries in Novokuybyshevsk, oil and pipeline stations and energy-fuel depots in Ryazan-Saratov-Bashkordostan with long-range UAVs from its own territory. These targets include air bases, power plants, oil refineries, and weapons production facilities. Ukraine’s current weapons have limits in range, warhead capacity, and speed, so they cannot fully achieve this aim. For this reason, Kyiv requests long-range, combat proven Tomahawk cruise missiles from the United States.

Ukraine uses domestically produced kamikaze drones and various missile systems to hit targets inside Russia. These systems achieve tactical success, but technical limits constrain their effects. Their short ranges, small warheads, and relatively slow speeds make them easier for Russian air defenses to intercept. This situation keeps successful strike rates below desired levels. At this point, Ukraine turns to Tomahawk missiles, which have long range and high warhead capacity and have proven themselves on the battlefield. Although Ukraine requested Tomahawk missiles, it used ATACMS missiles previously procured from the US inside Russia. The initial use of ATACMS missiles was limited such as in Kursk and the Bryansk region. After Ukraine’s use of ATACMS missiles, Russia moved fighter jets and helicopters from its bases near the border beyond the ATACMS zone.

By autumn 2024, Ukraine had received “fewer than 50” ATACMS missiles, the majority of which were used for attacks in border regions. In November 2024, the US expanded some permits for the use of ATACMS in Ukraine; the Biden administration allowed Ukraine to use ATACMS missiles to attack Russian border regions.

Following this permit, Ukraine began using ATACMS missiles against Russian border targets. Ukraine intends to use them against high-value, well-protected strategic targets inside Russia, such as air bases, power plants, oil refineries, and weapons factories.

Ukraine’s Current Capabilities and Shortcomings

Ukraine currently uses many kamikaze drones of various sizes and ranges. These systems work well at the tactical level, but their small warheads, low speeds, and limited ranges do not deliver sufficient effect against deep targets. Ukraine also uses cruise and ballistic missiles developed domestically or acquired from abroad to strike inside Russia. These strikes use many kamikaze drones of different ranges and sizes, as well as domestically developed or foreign-assisted systems such as Neptune cruise missiles, FP-5 Flamingo, and Tochka-U tactical ballistic missiles. However, these systems cannot match Tomahawk’s range and payload capacity.

Some Western systems have partially filled this gap. The U.S.-supplied ATACMS ballistic missiles and Storm Shadow / SCALP EG cruise missiles from the UK and France have been used successfully against Russian targets. However, the numbers of these munitions are limited and they quickly run low. This is because the missiles are delivered to Ukraine from abroad and the delivery is limited in number. Therefore, Ukraine cannot sustain continuous pressure on Russia.

Opportunities Provided by the Tomahawk

The BGM-109 Tomahawk has long range, high accuracy, and a powerful warhead. It has proven itself on battlefields for decades like Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syrian civil war. For Ukraine, the main advantage is the ability to strike strategic facilities deep inside Russia. This capability will make the Kremlin more aware that the war can threaten targets on its own soil.

Using a system like Tomahawk can raise Ukraine’s strike capability from the tactical level to the strategic level. This change brings military results and political-psychological effects that would be significant for Ukraine. Ukraine’s missile attacks deep inside Russia will cause panic and demoralization among the Russian army and people.

The range and impact of the Tomahawk missile depend on its specific variant. The system is produced in two main versions with operational ranges of approximately 1,600 and 2,500 kilometres. A missile with a 1,600-kilometer range would allow Ukraine to strike major Russian cities such as Volgograd, Moscow, and St. Petersburg. The longer-range 2,500-kilometer variant would extend Ukraine’s reach even deeper, enabling attacks as far as the Kazakhstan border and high-value military sites, including strategic bomber bases in Chelyabinsk and Murmansk. This extended range would significantly expand Ukraine’s ability to threaten key Russian infrastructure far beyond the current front lines.

Possible Consequences in Large Scale

The US’s willingness to supply Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine was interpreted by Russia as “Ukraine is now a direct proxy army of NATO.” Kremlin could declare this an existential threat, which would sharply escalate the nuclear threat narrative. Moscow may also consider closing the limited remaining diplomatic channels with Washington.

The risk of direct confrontation with the United States would increase significantly. It creates a hugely negative impact on peace talks. Because in this case, Moscow will not come to the table and may freeze the talks by saying, “The threat must be eliminated first.”

Kremlin and Putin describe Western arms deliveries as a “Western expansion of the war” and, thus, a de facto Western involvement in the conflict. This move by Russia forms the basis of its strategy of targeting Washington and/or London.

Russia increased the number of systems such as the S-400, S-300, Buk-M2, and Tor-M2, especially after attacks on bases, logistics centres, and airports in Crimea and Donbas. It tried to intercept ATACMS guided rockets and Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles by shifting air defence units to Crimea and the border areas.

Electronic warfare systems such as Krasukha and Pole-21 were activated to disrupt the guidance of GPS-guided ATACMS. After Ukraine’s ATACMS/Storm Shadow attacks, Russia retaliated with ballistic missile and drone strikes, mostly targeting energy infrastructure and military facilities in cities such as Kharkiv, Odessa, and Dnipro.

On June 24, statements were made as follows: “We are striking the warehouses where Western weapons are stored to retaliate.”  Moscow framed the use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow as “not Ukraine, but the US and UK/NATO are hitting us. “Kremlin claimed that these attacks were the direct responsibility of Washington and London and that Kyiv did not decide alone. Following Ukraine’s use of Western-made missiles, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that these attacks were the direct responsibility of the United States and the United Kingdom, adding that “Ukraine did not carry out these attacks alone.” He also emphasized that such actions demonstrate “direct Western involvement.”

Russian FM Lavrov have frequently warned that the use of these missiles “escalates the conflict.” The attacks in Crimea were described as “an attack on Russia’s territory.” Indirect threats were made against US and European capitals by Putin: The West’s supply of weapons to Ukraine would directly make these countries parties to the conflict.  

The incident, referred to as the Oreshnik attack took place on November 21, 2024, targeting the Pivdenmash facility in Dnipro, Ukraine. Putin and Russian officials said they considered the attack a response to Ukraine’s Western-backed use of long-range missiles.

In addition to all these risks and political tensions supplying Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine is not sufficient by itself. These systems require suitable launch platforms, trained personnel, and a comprehensive logistics chain. The most likely launch platform for Tomahawk is the Typhon missile system under U.S. development. However, Typhon remains in development, and the U.S. military does not yet field it in large numbers. This fact makes short-term Tomahawk transfers to Ukraine highly unrealistic.

Tomahawk use also needs targeting data, maintenance infrastructure, and full logistics support. Completing these requirements may take at least six to twelve months. Land-based launchers are fixed and offer Russia an opportunity to detect and counterstrike. For these reasons, delivering such a system to Ukraine in the short term seems unlikely.

The Trump administration will not be able to send Tomahawk missiles directly to Ukraine in the short term. Training and delivery of these systems takes approximately six months to a year. Kremlin could view the delivery of the missiles as a “direct NATO intervention.” Tomahawk missiles can only be used with suitable platforms, trained personnel, and comprehensive logistical support, all of which Ukraine lacks in the short term. Delivery and operationalization could take at least 6–12 months, so Tomahawk missiles will not be effective in the field in the short term.

A More Realistic Alternative: JASSM-ER

Given these challenges, a more practical and likely solution for Ukraine is the AGM-158B JASSM-ER air-launched cruise missile. Supplying these missiles looks technically and logistically much easier than supplying Tomahawk. Several reasons favor this option:

• Ukraine already operates F-16 fighter aircraft capable of carrying JASSM-ER.
• Air-launched missiles integrate faster than land-based systems.
• The logistics demands are lower and the training timeline is shorter.
• Air-launched weapons offer mobility for the launch platform, which makes detection harder and reduces the risk of counterattack against the launcher.

For these reasons, integrating AGM-158B JASSM-ER into Ukraine’s inventory looks operationally and technically more feasible than Tomahawk. An air-launched missile gives more operational advantage than a ground-launched system. A fighter-launched weapon makes it harder for Russia to detect the launch moment and the launcher’s location, improving the operation’s safety.

Conclusion: The Gap Between Request and Reality

Ukraine’s Tomahawk request represents a strategic-level desire. However, it mainly serves as a political message and bargaining tool. Transferring Tomahawk missiles requires extensive logistics, long training, and high-level political approvals. The United States has tended to supply Ukraine with tactical systems rather than strategic weapons like Tomahawk since the war began.

In the short and medium term, supplying air-launched long-range missiles such as JASSM-ER offers the most practical path for Ukraine. These missiles work with existing aircraft and can enter service more quickly and securely. Tomahawk demand remains important as a long-term goal or a diplomatic lever.

The extra procurement, training, and logistics Tomahawk requires, plus a likely six-to-twelve-month preparation period and the need for an appropriate launch platform, reduce the likelihood of short-term transfer. Land-based launchers’ visibility to Russian detection is another drawback.

Therefore, supplying air-launched, lower-logistics missiles like JASSM-ER offers a more effective way for Ukraine to reach deep targets in Russia.

Trump is unlikely to make such a sweeping U-turn anytime soon. Despite believing they are far from achieving peace, Trump will not hand over such extensive and dangerous equipment to Ukraine. If he does, he may restrict the use of the weapons (only targeting Ukraine, such as air bases).

Trump’s delivery of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine and the continued delivery of these missiles will significantly disrupt peace talks. However, a limited number of Tomahawks or other effective but less powerful equipment could be delivered to Ukraine to force Russia to the peace table and allow Ukraine to deter and dominate Russia.